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Abstract
Strategic purchasing is an essential health financing function. This paper compares the stra-
tegic purchasing practices of Thailand’s two tax-financed health insurance schemes, the
Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) and the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme
(CSMBS), and identifies factors contributing to successful universal health coverage out-
comes by analysing the relationships between the purchaser and government, providers
and members. The study uses a cross-sectional mixed-methods design, including docu-
ment review and interviews with 56 key informants. The Comptroller General Department
(CGD) of Ministry of Finance manages CSMBS as one among civil servant welfare pro-
grammes. Their purchasing is passive. Fee for service payment for outpatient care has
resulted in rapid cost escalation and overspending of their annual budget. In contrast,
National Health Security Office (NHSO) manages purchasing for UCS, which undertakes a
range of strategic purchasing actions, including applying closed ended provider payment,
promoting primary healthcare’s gate keeping functions, exercising collective purchasing
power and engaging views of members in decision making process. This difference in pur-
chasing arrangements resulted in expenditure per CSMBS member being 4 times higher
than UCS in 2014. The governance of the purchaser organization, the design of the pur-
chasing arrangements including incentives and use of information, and the institutional
capacities to implement purchasing functions are essential for effective strategic purchasing
which can improve health system efficiency as a whole.
Background
Purchasing is one among three key health financing functions [1], involving the transfer of
pooled funds to healthcare providers to secure services for a population. Strategic purchasing
has the potential to increase health system equity, efficiency and quality [2, 3]. A multi-country
study of strategic purchasing arrangements was undertaken by the Resilient and Responsive
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Strategic purchasing involves three sets of decisions: (a) identifying the interventions or ser-
vices to be purchased, taking into account population needs, national health priorities, cost-
effectiveness and other factors; (b) choosing service providers, giving consideration to service
quality, efficiency and equity and (c) determining how services will be purchased, including
contractual arrangements and provider payment mechanisms [6]. In performing strategic pur-
chasing, a clear regulatory framework and guidance by the government is required to ensure
that public health priorities are linked to resource allocation and purchasing decisions. As the
purchaser buys health services on behalf of the covered population, it is important for the pur-
chaser to ensure that there are effective mechanisms in place to determine and reflect people’s
needs, preferences and values in purchasing, and to hold health providers accountable to the
people.
In 2002, Thailand achieved full population coverage through three public health insurance
schemes. The Social Health Insurance (SHI) is a contributory scheme for private workers man-
aged by the Social Security Office (SSO) of the Labour Ministry. The other two schemes are tax
financed non-contributory schemes. The Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme (CSMBS) cov-
ers government employees and their dependents, and is managed by the Comptroller General
Department (CGD) of the Ministry of Finance. The Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) for the
remaining population, who are not members of SHI or CSMBS, is managed by the National
Health Security Office (NHSO).
Purchasing functions involve four key actors: the purchaser, the government, healthcare
providers and citizens. By analysing the relationships between these actors, this study assesses
and compares the purchasing functions of the UCS and the CSMBS. Lessons are drawn for
low and middle income countries in their quest for progressive realization of Universal Health
Coverage (UHC), in particular for efficiency improvement. This paper focuses on efficiency as
it is easily measured by expenditure per member.
Methods
A mixed method research design employing both quantitative and qualitative methods was
applied. Secondary data were collected from CSMBS and UCS. The qualitative methods
involved review of key documents and in-depth interviews and small group discussion with
key informants.
Documents reviewed were mainly unpublished grey literature such as laws, regulations,
governing board meeting minutes, annual reports of CSMBS and UCS; and published papers
on the performance of the two schemes. Documents were retrieved from three sources. First,
documents which were referred to by key informants, such as meeting minutes. Some unpub-
lished documents were accessed through official requests from researchers. Second, we
searched the websites of NHSO and CDG which focused on regulation and annual reports.
Third, peer review published journals were earched from PubMed. The scope of data search
covered the period since the inception of UCS in. S1 Table contains details of document
reviews.
Key informants were drawn from three stakeholder groups. First, senior management of
CGD and NHSO who are most knowledgeable about the policy and implementation of the
two schemes; second, health care providers, reflecting their perspectives on working with
CGD and NHSO; and finally beneficiaries from both schemes on their perspectives. In total 56
key informants were interviewed, including 13 senior managers from CGD and NHSO, 18
hospital managers and 25 UCS and CSMBS beneficiaries. Table 1 provides details of key
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informants’ profiles. Informed consent was obtained from each informant. Ethics approval
was obtained by ethics bodies at the Institute for the Development of Human Research Protec-
tion, Thailand and the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine.
Interviews and group discussions were recorded and transcribed in Thai. Data were ana-
lysed using content analysis according to a coding framework that was developed based on key
purchasing functions and relationships between the two insurance agencies and the govern-
ment, the healthcare providers and the beneficiaries [4].
Findings
CSMBS and UCS: Similarities and differences
Table 2 compares the profiles of the two schemes. Similarities are the dominant role of public
healthcare providers and comprehensive benefit package; both schemes are managed by the
public agencies (CGD and NHSO) which are financed by general tax through an annual
budget allocation. Differences are the governance of the purchasers and the design of purchas-
ing arrangements, including the provider payment mechanism. The CGD is a department of
the Finance Ministry. The CGD Director General reports to the Finance Secretary in a bureau-
cratic line of accountability. In contrast, NHSO is an autonomous public agency established by
the National Health Security Act 2002 with its own multi-stakeholder governing board—The
National Health Security Board (NHSB).
Health expenditure per member of CSMBS was four times higher than UCS during 2012–
2015 (Table 3). In 2015, CSMBS spent approximately 13,756 Baht per member (US$ 459, at 30
Baht exchange rate) while UCS spent 3,168 Baht per member (US$ 106). Outpatient services
accounted for about 70% of CSMBS spending (Fig 1).
CGD and NHSO: Relationship with the Government
Policy framework and governance: Determinants of accountability. There is neither a
legal mandate nor self interpretation by CGD that it is a purchaser organization. The Decree of
Ministry of Finance 1975 used the term "Birk Jai” meaning “public reimbursement” model for
CSMBS which reflects that CGD has responsibility for financial transactions only.
“. . .The Law does not indicate the mandate of ‘purchasing’ for us. We have a mandate to
reimburse money to the government officials. We have responsibility of controlling the
reimbursement process according to the Ministry of Finance rules and regulations.” [Pur-
chaser 3]
The National Health Security Act 2002 mandates NHSO to function as a purchaser agency
for UCS. NHSB lays down the policy and strategic direction that the Secretary General of
NHSO, appointed by the Board, has to follow and for which s/he is accountable through
Table 1. Profiles of key informants.
Key informant group Male Female Total Average age (min-
max)
Average work experiences, year
(min-max)
Purchasers: head of departments, four from CGD and nine from NHSO 6 7 13 50.7 (30–59) 12.8 (2–35)
Healthcare providers: director of hospital, head of insurance department, seven
secondary and eleven tertiary hospitals
8 10 18 44.2 (33–58) 12.7 (4–33)
Beneficiaries, eight UCS and 17 CSMBS members 10 15 25 45.3 (29–58) NA
Total key informants 24 32 56 46.3 (29–59) 12.8 (2–35)
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179.t001
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annual performance assessment. NHSB consists of 31 members from various stakeholder
groups, including five representatives from NGO constituencies who represent the concerns
of the UCS members in the Board’s decision making.
Table 2. Comparison various dimensions related to purchasing functions of UCS and CSMBS.
CSMBS UCS
Purchaser
organization
Comptroller General’s Department of the Ministry of Finance National Health Security Office, an autonomous public agency
established by law, with its own governing body.
What services are
purchased?
Similar to UCS, but use of non-essential medicines is permitted if
physicians confirm these are clinically indicated.
Comprehensive services, including medicines with reference to
National List of Essential Medicines (NLEM) for UCS beneficiaries and
Health promotion and disease prevention for all Thais (not only UCS
members)
Who uses the
services?
5 million members (8% of population) who are civil servants,
government pensioners and their parents, spouses, three children less
than 20 years old. Mostly live in urban and belong to rich quintiles.
The remaining 48 million, 75% of population who are not members of
CSMBS and SHI; mostly rural population in the informal economic
sector, 50% of them belong to the poorest and poor wealth quintiles
Who provides the
services?
No Primary Health Care gate keeping, direct access to public hospitals
and specialists. Access to private hospitals is only for life threatening
accident and emergencies.
A contracting public primary care provider network, notably district
health system, consisting health centres and a district hospital. The
network serves gate keeping function. UCS members need to register
with the District Health System (DHS) in their district of residence;
UCS members do not have free access to providers outside their
registered network unless they are referred. In urban areas, NHSO also
contracts qualified private clinics to provide ambulatory care
How are providers
paid?
Originally, fee-for-service was used for all services. Some beneficiaries
had financial barrier of paying money upfront and getting
reimbursement later. CSMBS reformed to disbursement from CDG
directly to providers for out-patient services in 2003 and Diagnostic
Related Group (DRG) for in-patient services in 2007. Currently, mixed
provider payment applied which are (1) all outpatient services are paid
on a fee for service basis, and directly disbursed from CGD to
healthcare providers on a monthly basis; (2) inpatient services are paid
by DRG without a global budget, different DRG base rates are applied,
with a higher rate for teaching than district hospitals; and (3) other high
cost interventions are paid by fee schedule, but at higher rates than UCS
Mixed provider payment applied which are (1) age adjusted capitation
paid to district health system, based on the number of registered
members in the catchment population. Costs of outpatient referral to
higher level are the responsibility of the network; (2) hospitals are paid
by DRG with national global budget. A single base rate per Relative
Weight is applied to all levels of hospital and to both public and private
facilities; (3) other high cost interventions such as dialysis,
chemotherapy, antiretroviral treatment are paid on a fee schedule; and
(4) health promotion and prevention for all Thais are mostly paid on a
capitation basis with some combination of fee schedules.
Source: Authors’ synthesis
Note: Details of Social Health Insurance for private sector employees are not included in this table as it is outside the scope of this study.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179.t002
Table 3. Expenditure per member of CSMBS and UCS.
2012 2013 2014 2015
CSMBS
• Expenditure (mln baht)  61,828 59,782 67,611 66,528
• Members  4,967,575 4,878,258 4,837,927 4,836,208
• Baht / member  12,446 12,255 13,975 13,756
USC
• Expenditure (mln baht)  140,609 141,540 154,258 153,152
• Members  48,620,104 48,612,007 48,312,428 48,336,321
• Baht / member  2,892 2,912 3,193 3,168
Differences of expenditure per member between CSMBS and UCS  4.3 4.2 4.4 4.3
Source: Authors’ compilation from several sources and calculation
 from Thai National Health Account
 Annual Report of UCS 2016
 Authors’ calculation
Note that due to data limitation, members of CSMBS were mixed with number of state enterprises; so the health expenditure per member of CSMBS might be lower
than it should be.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179.t003
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Budget and use of budget. Fee for service payment makes it impossible for the CGD to
control the CSMBS budget, resulting in regular overspending of the annual budget allocation,
with neither penalty nor challenge from the Ministry of Finance on CGD performance and
efficiency. The shortfall is covered by re-allocation from other budget lines. CGD feels justified
in using the government budget as these are entitlements of CSMBS members. There is no
annual report on CSMBS performance.
“The medical benefit of CSMBS members is one of the welfare programs that the govern-
ment provides to government officers in order to support and relieve them from the finan-
cial burden of sick people in his/her family.” [Purchaser 1]
In contrast, NHSO proposes and negotiates an annual budget envelope with the Bureau of
Budget representing the Government, using a per capita approach, called the capitation bud-
get. The capitation budget is arrived at by multiplying the capitation rate by the number of
beneficiaries. The capitation rate is estimated based on use rates of different services such as
outpatient and inpatient, and their unit costs. NHSO cannot and has never spent beyond the
approved envelope.
Fig 1. CSMBS annual expenditure: Total outpatient and inpatient care and annual growth 1988 to 2013.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179.g001
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Design of benefit packages and use of evidence. CSMBS does not have a clear mecha-
nism for designing the benefit package, but relies solely on the expert opinion of their Techni-
cal Advisory Committee, made up of medical specialists. There is no management of conflict
of interest in their advisory role.
Originally, the UCS applied the benefit package of the Social Health Insurance (SHI)
scheme, which covered almost all interventions other than a few specified interventions such
as cosmetic surgery and interventions of unproven effectiveness. Later, as capacity in Health
Technology Assessment (HTA) was established in Thailand [7], new interventions were sub-
jected to rigorous HTA [8]. One exceptional case is renal replacement therapy for renal failure
patients; peritoneal dialysis and hemo-dialysis are not cost effective and the long term budget
impact is substantial [9]. By assembling evidence on demand [10] and public opinion [11], in
2007, renal replacement therapy was included in the UCS benefit package [12], on the grounds
of providing financial risk protection to households and ensuring equity across insurance
schemes, as both CSMBS and SHI fully cover renal replacement therapy.
Another platform for encouraging efficient resource use is the Ministry of Public Health
sub-committee on the National List of Essential Medicines (NLEM). This process also applies
rigorous HTA when considering new medicines for inclusion in the NLEM which is refer-
enced by both UCS and CSMBS to define medicine benefits [13].
NHSO has actively engaged in and supported HTA for new interventions and convenes a
sub-committee under the NHSB to recommend which new interventions will be listed in the
UCS benefit package [14].
CGD and NHSO: Relationship with healthcare providers
Use of primary health care and gate keeping functions. There is no gatekeeping by pri-
mary care providers in the CSMBS, which provides its beneficiaries with a free choice of public
hospital outpatient and specialist services. Gate keeping is further hampered by fact that pri-
mary health care, which has been well developed in all districts of the country [15], is not well
developed in urban areas where the majority of CSMBS members reside. Interviews with CGD
and beneficiaries found little support for gatekeeping, and that all respondents prefer having
direct access to hospital and specialist services.
“CSMBS allows us to get services from any government hospitals. It is impossible and not con-
venient at all for a registration to only one health center or one district hospital. We are work-
ing in a city; we should go to a government hospital nearby our offices. . .” [Beneficiaries 1–12]
In UCS, the DHS, consisting of a district hospital and 10–15 sub-district health centres serv-
ing a typical catchment population of 50,000 people, carries out a gate keeping role. Patients
who bypass the primary care level without a referral document need to pay medical bills out-
of-pocket, which is not reimbursed by the UCS. This gate keeping function should lead to
rational use of services by level of care with lower travel costs for patients.
Use of provider payment methods. CSMBS applies fee for service reimbursement for outpa-
tient care, which encourages excessive use of medicines, especially those outside of the essential
drug list. Among the 33 hospitals most visited by CSMBS members, hospitals with relatively
higher expenditure prescribed a lower share of drugs from the NLEM. For example, University
Hospital number 08 had the highest average drug reimbursement per patient at 14,840 Baht (US$
495) per patient, and only 19.5% of total prescribed items were in the NEML (Fig 2) [16, 17].
In 2007 CSMBS replaced fee for service reimbursement for inpatient services by a multiple
DRG reimbursement rate system, which pays higher base rates for tertiary and teaching
Strategic purchasing and health system efficiency: A comparison of two financing schemes in Thailand
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hospitals, thereby encouraging their use. There is no discussion within the CSMBS of proceed-
ing towards a single DRG rate for all hospital levels.
Fee for service, lack of gate keeping for primary care, free choice of tertiary teaching hospi-
tals, and preferences for specialist care all result in excessive use of expensive outpatient ser-
vices and cost escalation in the CSMBS. In 2009, CGD closely monitored 168 tertiary hospitals
having more than 80% of total national outpatient caseload. A prescriber identification num-
ber for every clinician in these hospitals was introduced together with the use of electronic
outpatient claims and application of a unique identification for each medicine to enable
monitoring use of medicines by prescribers. This reform succeeded in halting the growth of
total outpatient expenditure over the period 2010–2014, however, outpatient expenditure
rebounded in 2015.
In contrast, the UCS uses closed-ended provider payment methods (capitation for outpa-
tient care and DRG for inpatient care) and imposes restrictions on medicines to contain cost.
The risk of DRG-creep (falsified up-coding of diagnosis in favour of higher DRG weight cases)
is managed by applying a global budget on top of the DRG system and a thorough system of
medical audit administered by the NHSO.
To avoid under-provision because of the closed-end payment systems, NHSO unbundled
certain high cost interventions from the capitation and DRG payments and reimburses these
Fig 2. Average reimbursed drug expenditure and proportion use of essential drugs in 33 hospitals, July 2011 to March 2012.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179.g002
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on a fee schedule. It also uses central procurement for expensive medicines such as anti-retro-
viral treatment and peritoneal dialysis solutions.
Exercising collective purchasing power. Each government hospital has its own procure-
ment mechanism for almost of all medicines, leading to highly atomised purchasing practices.
There is a large potential cost saving and efficiency gain if CGD were to procure medicines
centrally: one study among patients with high-cost medicines shows that cost of medicines was
about 73% of total healthcare costs [18].
In contrast, NHSO uses its substantial purchasing power to negotiate lower prices for some
selected high cost medicines and medical devices, leading to cost savings and a higher number
of patients receiving medicines. In 2008, selected high cost medicines (classified as E2) are
included in the NLEM with an aim of increasing access to high cost medicines for treating rare
or complex conditions. The E2 lists initially cover 10 speciality medicines (e.g. docetaxel for
breast and lung cancer) for 21 indications. The E2 program mandates all public insurance
schemes to fully subsidize the E2 medicines when patients meet specific clinical criteria [19].
In January 2009, the NHSO implemented the E2 program by introducing central procurement
with the Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) for all E2 medicines used for UCS
patients instead of individual hospital procurement. Healthcare providers are directly provided
with these E2 medicines by GPO via a vendor-managed inventory system. The central pur-
chasing implemented by NHSO and GPO in Jan 2009 resulted in lower prices of E2 medicines
[18, 20] by approximately 25% (range 8–40%) [21] which allowed the number of patient
receiving E2 medicines to increase significantly.
CGD and NHSO: Relationship with their members
An external review [22] by international experts confirmed the performance of the UCS in
terms of equitable access to and use of health services, low levels of unmet need [23] and finan-
cial risk protection while performance of CSMBS is limited.
Differences of CSMBS and UCS members. CSMBS members reside in urban areas and
are more educated and economically better off than UCS members (Fig 3) [24]. In order to
verify member entitlements at the point of service use, the UCS uses a national electronic data-
base with citizen ID numbers. This is facilitated by high coverage of civil registration of births
(96.7%) and deaths (95.2%) [25]. Accurate data and real time updates are critical for UCS to
allocate or re-allocate members and its capitation budget to a contracted DHS.
Members’ participation. The CGD call centre is available during government working
hours which are inadequate to respond to the immediate problems of CSMBS members. There
are 10,000 calls per year, or 180 calls per 100,000 members. These calls concern not only health
but also other benefits. CSMBS does not have a regular forum for engaging with its members.
An annual public hearing of UCS members and healthcare providers is legally mandated
and fully implemented by the NHSO. Gradually, the UCS has become owned by the people,
not by the political party which initiated it in 2001. An NGO called “the UCS Fan” (‘People-
HealthSystemsMovement’ on Facebook) was established some years ago. They closely monitor
the actions of the government, the Ministry of Public Health and the NHSB. They advocate for
an adequate annual government budget allocation for the UCS [26].
A 24-hour call centre service (known as “1330”), advises UCS members on entitlements
and other service enquiries and manages disputes between patients and providers. There were
600,000 calls in 2014, or 1,280 calls per 100,000 UCS members (10 times higher than CSMBS)
[27].
A summary of the relationships between the two schemes’ purchasers and their key stake-
holders is illustrated in Fig 4.
Strategic purchasing and health system efficiency: A comparison of two financing schemes in Thailand
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Factors influencing purchasing functions
Institutional capacity is critical for effectively undertaking the purchasing function. CSMBS is
one out of sixteen mandates of the CGD, which is responsible for all other benefits and welfare
systems. There is a total of 32 staff with no relevant background in health or public health.
NHSO has the sole mandate of managing the UCS. It had 820 staff in 2016, divided among the
central office and 13 regional NHSO offices. About one-third of total staff has a health back-
ground. Almost all the executive positions (67 out of 71 positions) are held by experienced and
highly qualified medical and health professionals.
In addition, the multi-stakeholder NHSB of the UCS is an effective forum for ensuring
accountability in decision making and represent the views of the taxpaying public and UCS
members. A synthesis of factors which contribute to / undermine effective purchasing prac-
tices in the two schemes is summarized in Table 4.
Discussion
Together, the evidence of the expenditure per member and many activities of the two purchas-
ers clearly show that UCS had more effective purchasing functions than CSMBS. These in turn
are due to many factors, including an appropriate legal framework, organizational arrange-
ments, and institutional capacity.
Strategic purchasing practices can improve health system efficiency. These include closed-
ended provider payment methods, use of a NLEM and systematic HTA for new procedures,
medicines and devices. The UCS has also avoided under-provision of services by unbundling
Fig 3. Economic status of beneficiaries across three public health insurance schemes.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179.g003
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certain high cost services from the capitation and DRG systems and replacing them with fee-
for-service according to an established schedule. The exercise of purchasing power by the
NHSO has reduced prices of key medicines and devices, and gate keeping of access to specialist
care by the DHS promotes rational use of the referral system. This has been complemented by
a well-functioning supply side, with extensive geographical coverage.
Fig 4. Summary of principal agent relationship between NHSO (left), CGD (right) and three main actors.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179.g004
Table 4. Contributing factors and undermining factors of purchasing functions.
Contributing factors Undermining factors
A. Legal framework Clear policy, expectation and mandate of “a purchaser” for benefit
of people and health system; NHSO has only one mandate of
managing UCS.
Clear policy of not operating as a purchaser but merely a payer,
responsible for financial transactions; CSMBS in one among
sixteen mandates of CGD. Therefore CGD has many other
important tasks including advice on financial management,
public procurement in the organization.
B. Governing body,
organization and accountability
framework
An independent organization; Governing body of multi-
stakeholders–citizens’ engagement; Adequate number and
competency of staff (including many with health background).
Government structure with rigid mandate using command and
control; Inadequate staff; Staff do not have health background.
C. Resource Tight budget with tough process of negotiation resulting in careful
management.
Soft budget constraint leads to inefficiency of the system.
D. Information Information management; Using appropriate information,
communication and technology; Pool of information from all
contracted providers to the national level.
Fragmented data requirement of different schemes creates
difficulties for providers.
E. Communication Two way communication; Proactive communication–NHSO staff
visited providers; NHSO conducts public hearing with citizens.
Official process of bureaucratic channels is ineffective.
F. Audit Independent auditing mechanism; Team work of audit; An
opportunity to improve knowledge and skill of the audit team and
providers and to improve data quality of providers; Penalty and
incentives must be implemented.
Negative attitude, perception and practice of investigators and
being investigated persons.
Source: Authors’ synthesis
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179.t004
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The problems of the CSMBS are clear and publicly known. Its inefficiency, cost escalation
and greater per capita expenditure than that of UCS members, stem from the fee for service
payment for outpatient service which triggers excessive use of non-essential medicines, while
CGD has limited regulatory capacity to audit and a lack of commitment to reform the inher-
ited weakness of fee for service. The lack of primary care provision, and provision of ambula-
tory services by the overcrowded outpatient departments of tertiary care hospitals are costly
while quality of services is poor. Despite these challenges, solutions are not forthcoming. CGD
has neither the commitment nor the technical capacity to introduce effective reforms. CGD’s
efforts to prohibit the widespread use of ineffective glucosamine were determined to be uncon-
stitutional by the Administrative Court after they were challenged by two CSMBS members
[28]. There are conflicts of interest among medical professionals favouring glucosamine and
the treatment guideline produced by Royal College of Orthopedists is unclear. CGD was criti-
cized for attempting to outsource the management of CSMBS to private insurance agencies, as
this measure would not address the fundamental problem of cost escalation caused by fee for
service payment. CSMBS members are worried that their benefits will be cut [29].
The higher cost per capita CSMBS members was not due to a more generous benefit pack-
age than UCS. There are few differences in the benefit package between the two schemes. For
example, dental services in CSMBS are slightly more extensive than UCS while UCS provides
more health promotion than CSMBS. The CSMBS fee for service payment for outpatient
results in prescription of more diagnostic procedures and medicines, which de facto provides
higher service intensities although de jure there are no significant differences in the outpatient
benefit package between the two schemes. The higher DRG payment rate paid by CSMBS for
the same clinical conditions in tertiary and teaching hospitals results in higher cost to CSMBS.
Despite the successful outcomes of UCS, a few challenges remain. Its reliance on an annual
government budget allocation runs the risk of lower budgets during the “lean years” of eco-
nomic downturn and government fiscal constraint. Where the budget allocation doesn’t
match the increased demand for health services, and labour and medicine cost inflation,
implicit rationing and waiting lists may emerge. Policies to address these risks include a dedi-
cated annual health tax, prepayment contribution with exemption of the vulnerable and poor
populations and introducing copayment. To ensure equity across population groups, prepay-
ment contribution and/or copayment must be applied to all three schemes.
Conclusion
The study demonstrates that strategic purchasing can improve health system efficiency as a
whole using multiple approaches i.e. using primary care as gatekeepers to promote appropriate
use by level of care, use of a closed-ended budget with proper mix of provider payment meth-
ods, effective application of a NLEM, exercise of purchasing power, and strengthening civil
registration for all schemes. These in turn are underpinned by a mix of design features, includ-
ing legal framework, primary mandate, governance, provider payment mechanisms and insti-
tutional capacity of the purchaser.
Though they arise from a specific context, the lessons from comparing these two systems in
Thailand should be useful for other countries considering how to strengthen strategic purchas-
ing in the context of their UHC reforms.
Supporting information
S1 Table. Document review.
(PDF)
Strategic purchasing and health system efficiency: A comparison of two financing schemes in Thailand
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179 April 2, 2018 11 / 13
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Walaiporn Patcharanarumol.
Data curation: Warisa Panichkriangkrai, Angkana Sommanuttaweechai, Yaowaluk
Wanwong.
Formal analysis: Warisa Panichkriangkrai, Angkana Sommanuttaweechai, Yaowaluk
Wanwong.
Funding acquisition: Kara Hanson.
Investigation: Warisa Panichkriangkrai, Angkana Sommanuttaweechai.
Methodology: Walaiporn Patcharanarumol, Kara Hanson.
Project administration: Yaowaluk Wanwong.
Resources: Kara Hanson.
Software: Yaowaluk Wanwong.
Supervision: Viroj Tangcharoensathien.
Validation: Walaiporn Patcharanarumol, Viroj Tangcharoensathien.
Visualization: Walaiporn Patcharanarumol.
Writing – original draft: Walaiporn Patcharanarumol.
Writing – review & editing: Walaiporn Patcharanarumol, Warisa Panichkriangkrai, Angkana
Sommanuttaweechai, Kara Hanson, Viroj Tangcharoensathien.
References
1. Kutzin J. A descriptive framework for country-level analysis of health care financing arrangements.
Health Policy. 2001 June; 56(3): 171–204. PMID: 11399345
2. World Health Organization. The World Health Report 2000. Health systems: Improving performance.
Geneva: World Health Organisation; 2000.
3. Preker AS and Langenbrunner JC, Eds. Spending wisely. Buying health services for the poor. Manag-
ing scarcity through strategic purchasing of health care. World Bank; 2005. Available from: http://bit.ly/
2FsHNp7 Cited 28 October 2017.
4. Strategic Purchasing Factsheet, Financing research theme. October 2014. Available from http://bit.ly/
2GFuUrh Cited 28 October 2017.
5. Investigating the purchasing arrangements for health care financing systems in low and middle-income
countries: Research summary. September 2013. Avalable from http://bit.ly/2GGIsCY Cited 28 October
2017.
6. Figueras J, Robinson R, and Jakubowski E. Eds. Purchasing to improve health systems performance:
drawing the lessons. Purchasing to imrpove health systems performance. Open University Pres; 2005.
Available from: http://bit.ly/2ox0vUJ Cited 10 June 2017.
7. Chootipongchaivat S, Tritasavit N, Luz A, Teerawattananon Y and Tantivess S. Factors conducive to
the development of health technology assessment in Asia. (Policy Brief) Manila: APO WHO Regional
Office of Western Pacific; 2015. Available from: http://bit.ly/2ERvTYX Cited 10 April 2016.
8. Mohara A, Youngkong S, Velasco RP, Werayingyong P, Pachanee K, Prakongsai P et al. Using health
technology assessment for informing coverage decisions in Thailand. J Comp Eff Res. 2012; 1:137–46.
https://doi.org/10.2217/cer.12.10 PMID: 24237374
9. Tangcharoensathien V, Kasemsup V, Teerawattananon Y, Supaporn T, Chitpranee V, and Prakongsai
P. Universal access to renal replacement therapy in Thailand: A policy analysis. Nonthaburi: Interna-
tional Health Policy Program & Nephrology Society of Thailand; 2005.
10. Kasemsup V, Teerawattananon Y, and Tangcharoensathien V. An estimate of demand for RRT under
universal healthcare coverage in Thailand. Journal of The Nephrology Society of Thailand. 2006; 12(2
supplement):125–35.
Strategic purchasing and health system efficiency: A comparison of two financing schemes in Thailand
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179 April 2, 2018 12 / 13
11. Tangcharoensathien V, Vasavid C, and Kasemsup V. An opinion poll on universal access to RRT under
UC in Thailand. Journal of The Nephrology Society of Thailand. 2006; 12(2 supplement):21–36.
12. Tantivess S, Werayingyong P, Chuengsaman P, and Teerawattananon Y. Universal coverage of renal
dialysis in Thailand: promise, progress, and prospects. BMJ. 2013 Jan 31; 346:f462. https://doi.org/10.
1136/bmj.f462 PMID: 23369775
13. Teerawattananon Y, Tritasavit N, Suchonwanich N and Kingkaew P. The use of economic evaluation
for guiding the pharmaceutical reimbursement list in Thailand. Zeitschrift fu¨r Evidenz, Fortbildung und
Qualita¨t im Gesundheitswesen, Vol 108;7: 397–404.
14. Jongudomsuk P, Limwattananon S, Prakongsai P, Srithamrongsawat S, Pachanee K, Mohara A, et al.
Evidence-based health financing reform in Thailand (chapter 16). In Clements B., Coady D., and Gupta
S., eds. The Economics of public health care reform in advanced and emerging economies, 307–26.
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2012
15. Patcharanarumol W, Tangcharoensathien V, Limwattananon S, Panichkriangkrai W, Pachanee K,
Poungkantha W, et al. Why and how did Thailand achieve good health at low cost?(chapter 7). In Bala-
banova D, McKee M, and Mills A, eds. ‘Good health at low cost’ 25 years on. What makes a successful
health system?, 193–223. London: London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 2011.
16. Jongudomsuk P, Srithamrongsawat S, Patcharanarumol W, Limwattananon S, Pannarunothai S, Vapa-
tanavong P, et al. The Kingdom of Thailand health system review. Manila: WHO Regional Office for
the Western Pacific; 2015.
17. Health Insurance System Research Office (HISRO). A proposal to contain cost of drugs of ambulatory
care in the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme. Nonthaburi, Health Insurance System Development
Office; 2012.
18. Sruamsiri R, Wagner AK, Ross-Degnan D, Lu CY, Dhippayom T, Ngorsuraches S, et al. Expanding
access to high-cost medicines through the E2 access program in Thailand: effects on utilisation, health
outcomes and cost using an interrupted time-series analysis. BMJ Open 2016; 6:e008671. 10.1136/
bmjopen-2015-008671 https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjopen-2015-008671 PMID: 26988346
19. National Drug Committee. National List of Essential Medicines 2008. Nonthaburi: Ministry of Public
Health, 2008.
20. National Health Security Office. Annual report 2012. Bangkok: National Health Security Office, 2012.
21. Government Pharmaceutical Organization. Report of central procument of E2 medicines 2009–2012.
Bangkok: Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO), 2013.
22. Evans T, Chowdhury MR, Evans D, Fidler AH, Lindelow M, Mills A, et al, Thailand’s Universal Coverage
Scheme: Achievements and Challenges An independent assessment of the first 10 years (2001–2010).
Nonthaburi: Health Insurance System Research Office. 2012.
23. Thammatacharee N, Tisayaticom K, Suphanchaimat R, Limwattananon S, Putthasri W, Netsaengtip R,
et al. Prevalence and profiles of unmet need in Thailand. BMC Public Health 2012; 12:923. https://doi.
org/10.1186/1471-2458-12-923 PMID: 23110321
24. National Statistical Office. Report of Health and Welfare Survey. 2015. Available from: http://bit.ly/
2ClLyOk Cited 8 May 2017.
25. National Statistical Office. Survey of Population Changes. NSO;2005. Available from: http://bit.ly/
2HKm6Sf Cited 16 April 2016.
26. People’s Health Systems Movement, Available from http://bit.ly/2BMqAr3 Cited 10 April 2017.
27. National Health Security Office. Annual Report 2014. Nonthaburi: NHSO; 2015. (In Thai)
28. Tantivess S, and Tangcharoensathien V. Coverage decisions and the court: a public health perspective
on glucosamine reimbursement in Thailand. Health Systems & Reform 2016; 2:106–11.
29. Saengpassa C. Plans for civil servant medical scheme must be made public. The Nations; December
13, 2016. Available from http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/national/30301966 Cited 24 February
2018.
Strategic purchasing and health system efficiency: A comparison of two financing schemes in Thailand
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0195179 April 2, 2018 13 / 13
